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 THE POLICY AND TARGETS OF CRIMINAL 
ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA AND THE 
UNITED STATES 
Haiyan Liu 
† 
Abstract: This comparative study analyzes the targets, consequences, and 
influence factors of the criminal enforcement of intellectual property rights in the United 
States and China.  The analysis reveals unexpected consequences when transplanting 
Western intellectual property law in Chinese contexts.  Similarities in criminal 
enforcement between the two countries indicate that economic factors that are 
determinant forces in both the United States and China.  These factors include such 
business practices as: (1) vehement business lobbying and the capture of enforcement 
agencies by top trademark corporations; (2) the size and market concentration level of top 
firms in an industry; and (3) trade association lobbying efforts, including foreign 
copyright associations exerting pressure on China.  
Political factors also influence criminal enforcement in China.  These factors 
include: (1) state interference to protect tax interests in tobacco and alcohol industries; (2) 
public policies to fight against counterfeits that pose health and safety threats; and (3) 
other political goals, such as control of the media and importation restrictions on 
publications.  
In order to promote IPR protection while reducing business capture, instrumental 
usage by the state, and unequal enforcement, this article recommends China (1) develop 
IP-related industries, (2) cultivate the IPR consciousness of citizens and companies, (3) 
establish respect for rights and rules, (4) encourage the mobilization of private rights by 
private entities, (5) allow citizen supervision of governmental activities, and (6) move 
from proactive administrative and criminal enforcement to civil enforcement.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Several converging trends place tremendous pressure on countries to 
criminalize intellectual property (“IP”) infringement.  For one, IP assets are 
becoming an evermore valuable and powerful component of the economy.1  
                                                     
† 
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1
  See ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION AND THE U.S. PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE REPORT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: INDUSTRIES IN 
FOCUS, (2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/publications/IP_Report_March_2012.pdf. 
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Additionally, technological advances make it increasingly easier to create, 
replicate, market, and distribute IP-containing products on a global scale, 
even as the same technologies enable pervasive and escalating infringement.  
Copyright piracy and trademark counterfeiting occurs in a variety of 
markets, from music, movies, outfits, shoes, toys, cigarettes, and alcohol to 
much more sophisticated products, such as automobile parts and medicine.2  
In response, businesses in intellectual property rights (“IPR”)-intensive 
industries have promoted the criminalization of IP infringement, especially 
in the United States and China—the two largest economies in the world. 
This article seeks to illuminate the current enforcement foci, patterns, 
consequences, and extra-legal forces of criminal IP enforcement in the 
United States and China.  Under the influence of several dominant economic 
and political factors, there is an overrepresentation in Chinese criminal IP 
cases of few top foreign companies, state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) in 
state-controlled industries, products carrying health or safety threats, and 
other regulated industries such as the publishing industry.  These results aid 
in evaluating the fairness and the level and state of democracy in politically 
motivated enforcement, and provide a basis for policy recommendations for 
enforcement reform.  This research is the first to systematically describe and 
empirically analyze multiple aspects of the criminal enforcement of IPR in 
China as compared to the United States.  
Part II of this article highlights the importance of the comparison of IP 
enforcement in China and the United States.  It introduces the law and 
society theoretical paradigms inspiring the analysis.  Part II also provides an 
overview of the most prominent forces shaping the overall strengths of IPR 
enforcement in China and the United States.  The literature review of 
previous studies covers literature on the criminal enforcement of IPR in both 
the United States and China and empirical research on IP protection and 
enforcement in China. 
Part III depicts the major research questions and explains data 
sources, types, and research methods.  Part IV presents detailed description, 
interpretation, and discussion of important empirical findings and their 
implications.  Part V considers implications of these findings for 
understanding the criminal enforcement of IPR, as well as larger issues of 
legal transplantation and law and development in an Asian and authoritarian 
                                                     
2
 See Annette D. Beresford, Christian Desilets, Sandy Haantz, John Kane & April Wall, Intellectual 
Property and White-collar Crime: Report of Issues, Trends, and Problems for Future Research, in 
COMBATING PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT AND FRAUD 73–94 (Jay S. Albanese, ed., 2006). 
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state such as China.  It also discusses how the findings contribute to 
generalizing causal and acting forces for the strength and foci of IPR 
enforcement in a country.  Finally, Part VI discusses further policy 
implications of the findings.  
 
II. BACKGROUND AND THEORY 
A. The Significance of IP Enforcement in China and the United States 
This study is a comparison of China and the United States.  IPR 
enforcement in China generated broad interest across a range of professions 
and political perspectives due to the salience of IP, the immense size of the 
Chinese market, and the increasing technology transfer between China and 
the rest of the world.3  The prolonged and unusually high rates of piracy and 
counterfeiting in China since the 1980s (see Figure 1) have irritated and 
baffled the United States.  For years, the United States has put China on the 
priority watch list in the Special 301 Report prepared annually by the Office 
of the United States Trade Representative. 4   The Special 301 Report 
identifies a list of "Priority Foreign Countries," which include those judged 
to have inadequate intellectual property laws.  In addition, the report 
contains a "Priority Watch List" and a "Watch List," containing countries 
whose intellectual property regimes are deemed of concern.5 
 
                                                     
3
  ANDREW C. MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 1-34 (2005). 
4
  INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, 2009 SPECIAL 301 REPORT ON COPYRIGHT 
PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT: PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) 84–85 (2009), available at 
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2009/2009SPEC301PRC.pdf. 
         
5
  Id. 
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Figure 1. PC Software Piracy Rates (in Percentages) in China, 
1994–20086 
 
Tension in trade between the United States and China escalated when, 
in 2007, the United States initiated a complaint against China in front of the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) dispute settlement body concerning 
China’s lack of protection and enforcement of IPR. 7   The WTO panel 
rejected the claim by the United States regarding China’s allegedly-
inadequate criminal enforcement of IPR.8  The WTO panel found the United 
                                                     
6
  See BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE REPORT, EIGHTH ANNUAL BSA GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY 
STUDY: TRENDS IN SOFTWARE PIRACY 1994 THROUGH 2002 8 (2003), http://www.bsa.org/~/media/Files/R
esearch%20Papers/GlobalStudy/2003/IPR_Global Study2003.pdf (last visited October 2, 2014) [hereinafter 
BSA GLOBAL SOFTWARE]; BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE REPORT, SIXTH ANNUAL BSA AND IDC 
GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY 12 (2009), http://global.bsa.org/globalpiracy2008/studies/ 
globalpiracy2008.pdf (last visited October 2, 2014) [hereinafter SIXTH ANNUAL BSA REPORT]. According 
to BSA reports, software piracy rates are the known percentage of pirated PC-packaged software out of the 
total amount of PC-packaged software installed that year.  See SIXTH ANNUAL BSA REPORT, supra at 17. 
7
  See PANEL REPORT, CHINA—MEASURES AFFECTING THE PROTECTION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 119-25, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) 
[hereinafter TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report]; Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, 89 
NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1056-1069 (2011) [hereinafter Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute], 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1676558. 
8
  See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 7, at 119–25; Yu, The TRIPS 
Enforcement Dispute, supra note 7, at 1046, 1068–69. 
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States did not provide credible and sufficient data to prove the case.9  Most 
of the press articles the United States provided as evidence were based on 
speculation, anecdotal comments, or random information concerning a 
particular high-profile case.10 
The United States has enacted new legislation, modified sentencing 
guidelines, and initiated large-scale political enforcement campaigns and 
coordination to expand criminalization.
11
  However, criminal prosecution 
and sanctions remain a tiny percentage of the overall volume of civil IP 
infringement disputes going through the judicial system each year.12  Such a 
consistent but moderate criminalization trend might be due to the existence 
of fairly effective civil remedies combined with the criminal justice system’s 
the lack of institutional capacity and the low political priority of the issue 
compared to other, more urgent, law and order problems.  
China provides an important example of the dynamics of legal 
transplantation: the indigenization and appropriation of the Anglo-American 
IPR model in the local context of Chinese society.  The ongoing 
transplantation of IP law to China is part of the “rule of law project” 
promoted by the United States in developing countries, similar to the law 
and development movement in the 1970s.13  The U.S. case represents the 
original IPR concepts and legal model growing out of classical liberalistic 
and individualistic ideas.  It makes sense to compare the two in order to 
detect the unique characteristics of legal appropriation and modification 
manifested through IPR enforcement in China as well as factors within the 
contexts where legal change takes place. 
                                                     
9
  See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 7, at 119–25; Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement 
Dispute, supra note 7, at 1046, 1068–69.  
10
  See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 7, at 119–25; Yu, The TRIPS 
Enforcement Dispute, supra note 7, at 1046, 1068–69. 
11
 See Haiyan Liu, The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China and the United States: 
Law & Society and Criminological Perspectives 147-68 (May 4, 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Indiana University) (on file with author) [hereinafter Liu, The Enforcement of IPR in China and the United 
States]. 
12
 Id. at 171-75. 
13
  See generally Randall Peerenboom, Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom, One Hundred 
Schools Contend: Debating Rule of Law in China, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 472-75 (2002). 
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B. Theoretical Approaches: Law and Society Paradigms and Legal 
 Transplant Theory 
Law and society literature offers important insights and analytical 
paradigms for analyzing the story of China’s IP law transplantation.  In the 
past, legal pluralist studies advocated using the power of state law to 
modernize and fundamentally change indigenous social orders. 14   More 
recently, others have pointed out that this social reform role of state law is 
limited.15  
According to James Gardner’s law and development classic, the U.S. 
legal models transplanted to Latin America in the 70s was marginally 
impacted the U.S. law and development programs.16  Transplanted models 
encountered strong resistance from local legal cultures, particularly from 
established legal institutions and personnel.17  Bits and pieces of the U.S. 
legal models were accepted only when there were similar internal legal 
changes already underway.  These new legal elements reinforced and 
interacted with each other, taking on directions not necessarily intended or 
expected.18   Gardner’s findings manifest the importance of studying the 
impact of indigenous contextual factors, situational characteristics, and 
institutional arrangements on legal reform and indigenization.19 
The stream of globalization has been accompanied by the 
transplantation of transnational business law and transnational legal culture.  
However, according to legal pluralist Brian Tamanaha, transplanted law does 
not necessarily mirror indigenous norms or social conditions as is the case in 
China.20  Transnational commercial rules derive from external market-based 
economic interests and concerns, which often are in conflict with local 
norms and practices.  Some transnational commercial rules are developed to 
promote business interests or to restrict or avoid the state’s power to control 
                                                     
14
 Sally E. Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 868, 874 (1988). 
15
  See generally id.; Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-autonomous 
Social Field As an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 L. & SOC’Y REV. 719, 742-45 (1973); Dennis 
O. Lynch, Hundred Months of Solitude: Myth or Reality in Law and Development?, 8 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 223 (1983); JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND 
FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA 239–46 (Univ. of Wis. Press 1980). 
16
 JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN 
AMERICA 239–46 (Univ. of Wis. Press 1980). 
17
 Id. 
18
  See generally Liu, The Enforcement of IPR in China and the United States, supra note 11. 
19
 Id. 
20
 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY 106–32 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2001). 
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economic affairs within its sovereignty.21  Since IPR is an important part of 
the transnational business law, Tamanaha’s arguments can also apply to IP 
laws and enforcement model transplanted to China.  
Tamanaha suggests another reason law does not mirror society is the 
expansion of administrative law. 22   The majority of IP infringements in 
China are processed by administrative agencies, such as the Administration 
of Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”) and Copyright Bureau.  Applying 
Tamanaha’s arguments, these administrative IP laws, regulations, and 
policies could often be used as instruments to balance interests and promote 
policies and social changes, rather than reflect social norms.23  
According to Tamanaha, “[w]hen mirroring is low and 
monopolization is high, the law will be more subject to capture and 
instrumental use by select groups, especially the economic or political elite 
(often including the legal professionals).”24  On the one hand, in the context 
of IP enforcement in China, the state and enforcement agencies could 
directly incorporate indigenous norms or politically prioritized goals into IP 
law enforcement.  On the other hand, top corporations, their IP attorneys, 
and trade associations might get involved in the capture and instrumental use 
of the IP enforcement system through agency participation.  
     
C. Macro-level factors Shaping IPR Enforcement in China and the 
United States 
 
Through review of IP as well as law and society literature, and 
theoretical analysis, this article identifies three major macro-level factors 
that shape the main mechanisms and levels of IPR enforcement in the United 
States and China.25  These factors are: (1) divergent views of human nature, 
property rights, and intellectual products within each country; (2) the 
different stages of economic prosperity and technology development; and (3) 
the general purpose and level of independence of the countries’ judicial 
systems, especially economic law systems.  
                                                     
21
   Id.  
22
   Id. 
23
   Id. 
24
   Id. 
25
   Liu, The Enforcement of IPR in China and the United States, supra note 11, at 95–112. 
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The cultural and political ideologies behind justifications of IPR differ 
in China and the United States.26  William Fisher concludes that one of the 
most important mainstream justifications of IPR in the United States is John 
Locke’s labor theory and his notion of possessive individualism. 27  
Additionally, Robert Merges argues that it was inconclusive whether social 
utilitarianism, as laid out by the U.S. Constitution, justified IPR protection.28  
Instead, Merges recognizes “(1) Lockean (‘labor theory’ of) appropriation 
and (2) Kantian (liberal) individualism” as the fundamental principles of IP 
law.  According to Merges, Kant emphasizes “the unique contribution of 
each creative person” in producing IP and, thus, the state acknowledges 
individual freedom and autonomy by recognizing IPR.29  Continuing this 
individualistic and liberalistic tone, the discourse of “romantic authorship” 
arose in the mid- to late-eighteenth century.  In this view of creative work as 
property, not only the “labor” but also the “originality” and personality of 
the author justifies his ownership of his literary expression.30  Both labor 
theory and “romantic authorship” are deeply rooted in the Anglo-American 
individualistic assumption about human nature and the relationship between 
humankind and the environment.31  
In contrast, the Chinese indigenous worldview—dominated by holistic 
conceptions of human nature, humankind and the environment, 
rights/entitlements, and intellectual products32—differs from the Western 
individualistic, classical liberalistic approaches to property rights.33  More 
                                                     
26
   See generally id. 
27
  William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL 
THEORY OF PROPERTY 170–74 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001). 
28
  Compare ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 13, 20 (Harvard Univ. Press 
2011). 
29
 Id. 
30
  See Rosemary J. Coombe, The Properties of Culture and the Politics of Possessing 
Identity: Native Claims in the Cultural Appropriation Controversy, 6 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 249 
(1993); see also Fisher, supra note 27, at 171–72, 174. 
31
  See Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes toward a Cultural 
Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293–1326 (1996); see generally LAIKWAN PANG, 
CREATIVITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS: CHINA’S CREATIVE INDUSTRIES AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS OFFENSES 29–45 (Duke Univ. Press 2012). 
32
  See generally RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF THOUGHT: HOW ASIANS AND 
WESTERNERS THINK DIFFERENTLY…AND WHY 1–164 (Free Press 2003) (contending that cultural and 
psychological research shows that East Asians and Westerners think about the world differently because of 
differing ecologies, social structures, philosophies, and educational systems that date back to ancient 
Greece and China); HANBAO MA, LAW AND TRADITIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINESE SOCIETY 47, 55–56 
(Nat’l Taiwan Univ. 1999) (discussing the traditional Chinese legal culture). 
33
 Liu, The Enforcement of IPR in China and the United States, supra note 11, at 95–112. 
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specifically, classical liberalistic thought considers private property rights, 
including IPR, as natural and inalienable.  Under that view, therefore, rights 
are superior to interests, and individual rights are more precious than 
collective welfare, social harmony, and public order.34  In contrast, in China 
individual rights carry a dark intonation of “self-interest” within the context 
of Confucian teaching.  “Entitlements” in traditional China are one’s share 
of the communal interest as a whole.  Communal interests and harmonious 
relationships often are shared priorities, and individuals are expected to 
sacrifice their own interests if the community requires it.35  
In addition to Confucianism, contemporary Chinese justifications of 
IPR are heavily influenced by the Marxist philosophy of dialectic 
materialism and political economic analysis of IPR as forms of both 
superstructure and ideology. 36   Marxism’s fundamental elements were 
indoctrinated as the dominant philosophical and political ideology in China 
by the political regime of the communist party—though subsequently the 
party abandoned the idealistic goals and aspirations of socialism turning 
China into a capitalist state.37  Moreover, stages of economic prosperity and 
technology development in the United States and China vary vastly.  
Quantitative research indicates that economic factors correlate strongly and 
positively with both the numbers of IPR granted and IPR enforcement 
strength in a nation. 38   Economic prosperity, especially high stages of 
technology development, promotes the flourishing of businesses and trade 
                                                     
34
  Randall Peerenboom, Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom, One Hundred Schools Contend: 
Debating Rule of Law in China, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 494 (2002). 
35
   HANBAO MA, supra note 32, at 55–56. 
36
   See generally JOHN R. SUTTON, LAW/SOCIETY: ORIGINS, INTERACTIONS, AND CHANGE 
61–98 (Sanford Robinson & Cindy Bear eds., Pine Forge Press 2001); KARL MARX, CAPITAL, 
VOLUME 1: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 53–210, 241–87, 486 (Ben Fowkes Trans., Int’l 
Pub. 1967) (1887). 
37   
QU SANQIANG, QIESHU JIUSHI TOU: LUEN ZHONGGUO CHUANTONG WENHUA YU 
ZHISHICHANQUAN [STEALING A BOOK IS THEFT: ON CHINESE TRADITIONAL CULTURE AND IPR] 73 
(Zhishi Chanquan Chubanshe, 2006) (China). 
38
 See Jeffrey S. Schroeder, Rights Grantors and Rights Seekers: A Theory for 
Understanding the Comparative Development of Intellectual Property Rights 238–56 (2001) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Political Science, Univ. of Oregon) (on file with the 
Univ. of Oregon Library); see also MARTIN K. DIMITROV,  ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION, 
LEGAL FRAGMENTATION, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES :  THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS LAWS IN CHINA, RUSSIA, TAIWAN, AND THE 
CZECH REPUBLIC 120–74 (Stanford Univ. 2004) [hereinafter DIMITROV, ADMINISTRATIVE 
DECENTRALIZATION].  
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associations with strong IP interests.  39  They provide the most direct and 
powerful internal pushes for the protection of IPR.40  The United States has a 
high stage of economic development and an advanced level of technology, 
hosting numerous large businesses and industries that have strong IPR 
interests and are active in business lobbying.41  
China on the other hand experienced a period of rapid economic 
growth in the past two decades, along with the gradual strengthening of 
industries with strong IP interests.42  The tremendous regional disparities of 
economic development in China create further obstacles to IP enforcement, 
especially in regions that are experiencing a rapid economic boom but that 
have not produced enough of their own IP products to raise their awareness 
of IPR protection. 43   Finally, China does not have a tradition of legal 
formalism;44 its judiciary emphasis on substantive justice contrasts sharply 
with that of the relatively independent and powerful U.S. legal system.45  
                                                     
39
  See Schroeder, supra note 38, at 238-56; see also DIMITROV,  ADMINISTRATIVE 
DECENTRALIZATION, supra note 38, at 120–74. 
40
 See Schroeder, supra note 38, at 238-56; see also DIMITROV,  ADMINISTRATIVE 
DECENTRALIZATION, supra note 38, at 120–74. 
41
  For example, active and powerful trade associations in copyright-intensive industries 
include the Business Software Alliance (BSA), the Software and Information Industry Association 
(SIIA), the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), and the Motion Picture 
Association (MPA) of America.  They play crucial roles in implementing U.S. copyright laws and 
policies, both domestically and abroad.  See MERTHA, supra note 3, at 35–76; see generally 
CHRISTOPHER MAY & SUSAN K. SELL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CRITICAL HISTORY 
(Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006); Joe Karaganis & Sean Flynn, Networked Governance and the 
USTR, in MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES ch. 2 (Joe Karaganis ed., Social Science 
Research Council, 2011) (explaining how industry groups and business representatives “forum 
shop” internationally for institutions where they can pressure for stronger IP protection measures; 
domestically, they regularly attempt to coordinate various enforcement agencies to strengthen  
enforcement), available at http://piracy.americanassembly.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/06/MPEE-
PDF-1.0.4.pdf); Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal 
Governance Approach, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 401 (2004). 
42
  See generally Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China 
Puzzle, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais, ed., 2007) [hereinafter 
Yu, Intellectual Property] (exploring the role of intellectual property protection in promoting 
economic development in China). 
43
 Interview with Richard S. Gruner, Distinguished Senior Professor of Law, Whittier Law 
School (June 23, 2010). 
44
 See generally STANLEY LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 
11-39 (Stanford Univ. Press 1999). 
45
  See generally SUTTON, supra note 36, at 99–132 (on the definition and theory of Max 
Weber’s legal formalism); Stanley B. Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform after Twenty 
Years, 20 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 383 (2000); LUBMAN, supra note 44. 
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Politics and law are much more closely intertwined in China. 46   China 
neither emphasizes nor seriously practices notions of judicial independence, 
judicial review, and rule of law.47  The court as an institution is much weaker 
than local governments, administrative agencies, and some other judicial 
agencies, such as the procuratorate.48   The procuratorate is the office of 
prosecutors in China.  China does not have a rational law system, where the 
consistent and strict function of rules and procedures is highly respected.49  
The Chinese government voluntarily transplanted Western law, 
including IP laws.50  It was motivated by a set of historically determined 
political goals: modernization of the nation, development of the economy, 
introduction of foreign investment and advanced technology, maintenance of 
market order, preservation of governmental stability, and restraint of local 
government authority to strengthen the central state. 51   Thus, China 
borrowed Western laws as instruments with whatever modifications are 
necessary to fix Chinese indigenous problems.52  As a result, the Chinese 
government can easily use the legal system, including IP laws and the 
criminal justice system, to serve its policy priorities or state interests.53  
This study centers on testing empirically the justifications and foci of 
the criminal enforcement of IPR in China.  Anglo-American IPR and IP laws 
have swiftly transplanted to China despite those two societies’ 
fundamentally distinct philosophical worldviews, economic conditions, 
political interference, and legal systems. 54   Given the context of IPR 
enforcement in China outlined above, this article identifies the major results 
of such an East and West collision at the criminal IP enforcement stage. 
                                                     
46
  See Lubman, supra note 45, at 11-39; see generally LUBMAN, supra note 45 (reviewing 
some of the major characteristics of Chinese legal institutions as they have developed since the 
initiation of legal reform after Mao, including the unique characteristics of Chinese legal system). 
47
 See LUBMAN, supra note 45. 
48
 Id. 
49
 See generally SUTTON, supra note 36. 
50
 Zhu Suli, Political Parties in China’s Judiciary, 17 Duke J. COMP. & INT’L L. 533, 548–52 (2007). 
51
 Id. at 548–52. 
52
 Id. 
53
 Id. 
54
 WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 9–29 (Stan. Univ. Press 1995). 
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D. Past Comparative IP Enforcement Studies 
Scant research exists on the primary concerns of U.S. businesses: IPR 
enforcement itself inside China.55  Most work on this topic concerns the 
legislative history and legal analyses of IP legal codes in China, as well as 
Sino-U.S. trade negotiations.56  This section first summarizes William Alford 
and Peter Yu’s classical legal studies on IP protection and enforcement in 
China.57  Then it turns to the more recent important empirical studies on IPR 
in China conducted by Andrew Mertha and Martin Dimitrov from the 
perspective of political science.58  The literature review concludes with a 
brief summary of the research on the criminal enforcement of IPR in both 
the United States and China including the empirical criminological studies 
done by Mark Motivans and Jay Albanese.59 
 Building on the groundwork Alford, Mertha, and Dimitrov have laid, 
this article brings knowledge of the rapidly changing field of IPR 
enforcement into the present.  This article analyzes official U.S. datasets for 
about half of the federal criminal IP cases occurring from 2002 to 2007.  It is 
thus far the most up to date and comprehensive quantitative study on this 
subject.  While previous studies concentrated on analyzing obstacles to 
administrative enforcement, this article looks closely at the performance of 
criminal enforcement agencies, the priorities of criminal enforcement in 
                                                     
55
 INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, 2009 SPECIAL 301 REPORT ON COPYRIGHT 
PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT: PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) 84–85 (2009), available at 
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2009/2009SPEC301PRC.pdf. 
56
  See generally Andrew C. Mertha, Pirates, Politics, and Trade Policy: Structuring the 
Negotiations and Enforcing the Outcomes of the Sino-US Intellectual Property Dialogue 1991-99 
(2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with the University of 
Michigan). 
57
  See ALFORD, supra note 54; Peter K. Yu, The Second Coming of Intellectual Property Rights, in 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OCCASIONAL PAPERS 11, 16-26 (2006), available at 
http://www.peteryu.com/2dcoming.pdf [hereinafter Yu, The Second Coming]; Peter K. Yu, The Copyright 
Divide (Mich. State Univ. DCL Coll. Of Law, Working Paper No. 1-21, 2003) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=460740 [hereinafter Yu, The Copyright Divide]; Yu, 
Intellectual Property, supra note 42; see generally Peter K. Yu, The Sweet and Sour Story of Chinese 
Intellectual Property Rights, in TECHNOLOGY, PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY: A HISTORY OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT (Graham Dutfield & Uma Suthersanen eds., forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter 
Yu, The Sweet and Sour Story]. 
58
  See generally MARTIN K. DIMITROV, PIRACY AND THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009) [hereinafter DIMITROV, PIRACY AND THE 
STATE]; see generally DIMITROV, ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION, supra note 38; see also MERTHA, 
supra note 3. 
59
  See Mark Motivans, Intellectual Property Theft, 2002, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (Oct. 
2004); Beresford, supra note 2, at 73–74. 
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action, and the forces shaping enforcement patterns.  Taking a grounded-
theory approach, this article is not confined to analyzing the impact of 
political, institutional, structural, and bureaucratic factors on the 
enforcement. 
William Alford’s classical work elaborates on a rushed but vacillating 
law-making process undertaken in China with the initiation of the Chinese 
“economic reform (gaige kaifang改革开放) policy under both internal and 
external pressure. 60  It asked why, during thousands of years of civilization, 
China did not develop anything similar to the Anglo-American IPR model.61  
He suggests the answers stem from Confucian teachings that rules and ideas 
come from nature, and in the critical role played by a shared past for moral 
and intellectual elevation.62  The indispensability of communication with the 
past requires free communal access to nature’s self-expressions recorded in 
intellectual products.63  Alford’s research, however, focuses mostly on law-
making and not on enforcement.  
More recently, Peter K. Yu’s writings about the legislative, 
enforcement, and policy-making aspects of IP laws in China also aim to 
facilitate U.S. policy makers’ understanding of IPR from the indigenous 
Chinese perspective and contexts.64  Andrew Mertha and Martin Dimitrov 
concentrated on the impact of political models, administrative institutional 
structures, and bureaucratic incentives on the effectiveness of IPR 
enforcement, especially administrative enforcement. 65   Mertha rejects 
Alford’s arguments concerning Chinese indigenous culture and social norms.  
This research completes and updates Alford’s cultural arguments in 
multidisciplinary contexts and examines them against empirical data.  Alford 
is correct that indigenous culture and social norms play a crucial role in 
explaining why transplanted IP laws were ignored and marginalized by both 
the public and enforcement agencies for decades after their introduction into 
China. 66   Arguments based on institutional structures and bureaucratic 
                                                     
60
 ALFORD, supra note 54. 
61
 Id. 
62
 Id. 
63
 Id. 
64
  See generally Yu, The Second Coming, supra note 57, at 16-26; Yu, The Copyright 
Divide, supra note 57; Yu supra note 42.  
65
 See generally DIMITROV, PIRACY AND THE STATE, supra note 58; DIMITROV, 
ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION, supra note 38; see also MERTHA, supra note 3. 
66
 ALFORD, supra note 54. 
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incentives alone cannot explain the exceptionally high rates of piracy and 
counterfeiting in China.67  
In terms of research on the criminal enforcement of IPR, there is 
surprisingly little empirical study within the United States.68  Intellectual 
Property Theft and Fraud explores the definitions, impact, boundaries, 
elements, criminological causes, and policy recommendations of the 
problem as well as the relationship of IP theft to fraud, organized crime, 
white-collar crime, and globalization.69  Incorporating government statistics, 
Mark Motivans’ Bureau of Justice Statistics report summarizes the trends of 
IP criminal and civil cases from 1994 to 2002.70  However, without solid 
empirical data, most research in this book is exploratory. 
Dimitrov’s study, Mertha’s analysis of sources of resistance and 
barriers against criminalization is grounded solely in aspects of 
organizational structures and bureaucratic incentives. 71  Literature on the 
criminal enforcement of IPR in China is even scarcer.  Dimitrov is the only 
scholar who has conducted systematic empirical work to describe and 
analyze the statutory bases, police structures, enforcement practices, 
barriers, and aggregate official enforcement statistics on the criminal 
enforcement of IPR in China.72  Successfully describing a large comparative 
terrain, Dimitrov’s research on criminal IPR enforcement lacks the benefits 
that a more targeted, in-depth analysis can offer.   
 
III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS, DATA, AND METHODS 
 
China has swiftly transplanted a whole set of Anglo-American IPR 
and IP laws despite those societies’ essentially discrete economic, cultural, 
political, and legal contexts.  The mainstream justification for IPR in the US 
                                                     
67
 See BSA GLOBAL SOFTWARE, supra note 6, at 10-11; SIXTH ANNUAL BSA REPORT,  supra note 6, 
at 10-11.  
68
 See Motivans, supra note 59; see Beresford, supra note 2. 
69
 See Beresford, supra note 2. 
70
 See generally BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SUSPECTS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL 
MATTERS CONCLUDED DURING FISCAL YEAR 2002; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEFENDANTS 
SENTENCED UNDER THE GUIDELINES DURING FISCAL YEAR 2002; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL CASES TERMINATED DURING FISCAL YEAR 2002.  Motivans’ paper uses 
the same type of U.S. official annual datasets that this research uses; however, his analysis only 
covers the annual datasets up to 2002, and he only conducted basic descriptive analyses to reveal 
the general trends of the annual data.  Motivans, supra note 59. 
71
 See MERTHA, supra note 3, at 202–09. 
72
 See DIMITROV, PIRACY AND THE STATE, supra note 58, at 146–81; DIMITROV, 
ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION, supra note 38. 
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is to protect individual rights.  This article hypothesizes that the main goal of 
criminal enforcement of IPR in China is to repress activities seriously 
violating “socialist market order.” 73   The above hypothesis is tested by 
analyzing the types of IP infringements enforcement agencies focus on, 
infringement victim profiles, objectives and targets of enforcement 
operations, and surveys on the public perceptions of IPR, infringements, and 
enforcement.  Additionally, this article considers the factors determining the 
patterns of the criminal enforcement of IPR in China and the United States 
through in-depth interview and documentary analyses. 
In order to test the above descriptive and explanatory hypotheses, five 
types of empirical data were collected: (1) summary judgments of 376 
Chinese criminal IP cases,74 (2) U.S. official annual statistics on about half 
of all IP criminal cases containing rich individual case information,75 (3) 
news reports on 239 U.S. IP thefts,76 (4) aggregate official statistics on IPR 
criminal and administrative enforcement in both countries,77 and (5) in-depth 
                                                     
73
 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (97 Xiudin) (中华人民共和国刑法 (97修订)) [Criminal 
Code of the People’s Republic of China (97 Revision)] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 
1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997) 1997 Order of the President of PRC No. 83, at ch. 3, § 7 [hereinafter Criminal 
Code of the People’s Republic of China (97 Revision)]. 
74
 The Chinese data analyzed comes from the databases of the summary judgments that 
come from the largest publicized Chinese summary judgment databases. The author searched 
various databases, including the Beijing University Lawyee website and Chinalawinfo.com.  An 
additional number of summary judgments were obtained directly from district courts.  See 
generally Zhanjian Tushuguan [Zhanjiang Library], Beida Fayi Anli Shujuku Jieshao [The 
Introduction to Beijing University Lawyee Case Database], ZJLIB (2008), available at 
http://www.zjlib.com/2008/bdfy.htm. 
75
  The U.S. datasets on criminal enforcement are located in the “standard analysis files” 
(SAF) available from the Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center website. Among them, the 
“Defendants Sentenced” files (data name: SC09OUT) from the U.S. Sentencing Commission has 
been used for this research. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEFENDANTS SENTENCED UNDER 
THE GUIDELINES from 2002-2008.  
76
  Computer Crime & IP Section, CCIPS Press Releases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/pr.html (last visited May 15, 2013). 
77
  The criminal enforcement component of U.S. enforcement statistics is located in the 
Attorney General’s Annual Reports on the U.S. Department of Justice’s website.  See 1999–2005 
Intellectual Property Crime Report, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, available at   
http://www.justice.gov/ag/publications.htm (last visited June 21, 2013).  The aggregate official 
criminal and civil case statistics from 1994 to 2002 can be found in Mark Motivans’s BJS report.  
See Motivans, supra note 59, at 1–10.  The Chinese IPR enforcement data mostly come from 
governmental reports on aggregate annual IPR enforcement statistics.  See generally GUOJIA 
ZHISHI CHANQUAN JU [STATE IP OFFICE OF CHINA], 1998–2008 ZHONGGUO ZHISHI CHANQUAN 
BAOHU ZHUANGKUANG [WHITE PAPERS ON CHINA’S IPR PROTECTION IN 1998–2008], available at 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zwgs/zscqbps/ (last visited June 29, 2013); additional patent 
administrative enforcement data is obtained from the patent administrative enforcement data 
section of the State Intellectual Property Office of China’s website, and copyright administrative 
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interviews with IP practitioners in China.  The first three provided the 
datasets to analyze targets, roles, and consequences of criminal enforcement.  
The author used aggregate statistics to verify the reliability of the three 
datasets, and used the interviews to help interpret the statistical findings. 
This article codes numerous variables from the Chinese summary 
judgments into its analysis.  The first set of variables includes victim 
characteristics such as SOEs, domestic, or foreign companies.  The second 
set of variables categorizes types of infringements.  These include:  the types 
of IPR; types and industries of merchandise; whether they are top 
brands/copyrights or not; consumer products or luxury goods; and whether 
the offense involves health, safety, governmentally controlled industries, or 
other politically prioritized issues.  The published summary judgments are 
not a random sample and cannot be used for making generalizations to the 
national population.78 Nevertheless, considering the particular scarcity of IP 
criminal cases and the absence of other, more reliable data sources, the 
sample of over 300 criminal IP cases offers valuable answers to the research 
question. 
This article additionally codes about 30 in-depth interviews conducted 
in Beijing in summer 2010 with IP practitioners.  The practitioners include 
trademark and copyright agents, attorneys, judges, law enforcement 
officials, law professors, and senior researchers who were knowledgeable 
and experienced in relation to the topics of this research.  The author 
obtained informative interviews were obtained with several top officials at 
copyright enforcement agencies and their research centers, with judges of 
Beijing high courts and lower-level courts, and with researchers at the 
Intellectual Property Center of the China Academy of Social Sciences.  
                                                                                                                                                              
statistics from the National Copyright Administration of China’s website. See generally GUOJIA 
ZHISHI CHANQUAN JU [STATE IP OFFICE OF CHINA], 2006-2007 ZHUANLI ZHIFA SHUJU TONGLI 
[2006–2007 PATENT ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT DATA], available at 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo/zlgl/xzzf/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2008); GUOJIA GONGSHANG 
XINGZHENG GUANLI ZONGJU [GENERAL ADMINISTRATION FOR INDUSTRY & COMM.] 1998–2009 
ZHINGGUO GINGSHANG XHINGZHENG GUANLI NIANJAN [1998–2009 CHINA INDUSTRY & COMM. 
ADMIN. REGULATION YEARBOOK] (Beijing Gongshang Chubanshe); GUOJIA BANQUAN JU [NAT’L 
COPY. ADMINISTRATION OF CHINA], 2000-2006 COPYRIGHT ADMINISTRATIVE DATA, available at 
http://www.ncac.gov.cn/GalaxyPortal/inner/bqj/include/list_column_bqtj.jsp?BoardID=304&boar
did=11501010111610&bqgbid=11501010111610  (last visited Sept. 1, 2008). 
78
  Lu Hong, Legal Responses to Trafficking in Narcotics and Other Narcotic Offenses, 18 
CHINA INT’L CRIM. J. REV. 212, 219 (2008). 
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The U.S. dataset is abundant in individual case and defendant 
information.79  It contains information on the vast majority of the felony 
defendants of IP thefts in the federal criminal justice system, including those 
plea-bargained, bench tried, and not convicted.  About half of the IP 
defendants were processed by the federal system each year.80  The news 
releases report collected from the website of the Computer Crime & IP 
Section of the Department of Justice on a total of 239 IP criminal cases serve 
as complementary data for the official dataset.81 These news reports provide 
additional information on types of offenses, detailed crime descriptions, 
victim characteristics, and investigation processes for individual IP theft 
cases.  
Finally, the aggregate official enforcement statistics outline a broad 
picture of the case distribution and processing results across civil, 
administrative, and criminal IP enforcement.  They also show trends of 
enforcement rates, sanction levels, and case attrition through these processes 
and offer the starting point for comparison between the United States and 
China.  
The analyses of this study are conducted from two broad theoretical 
perspectives: (1) law and society, and (2) enforcement and criminology.  The 
quantitative part of this research involves descriptive analyses of the data 
(such as categorization, graphs, calculation of frequencies, ranges, and 
central tendency) using statistical software SPSS and Access.  Tables and 
graphs are frequently used to help demonstrate patterns that emerged from 
the results. 
 
IV. RESULTS 
 
Statistical analyses of the three main case datasets and documentary 
analyses address above research questions on the foci and roles of the 
criminal enforcement of IPR.  Statistical results partially support my initial 
hypotheses that the role of criminal enforcement of IPR in China is to 
prioritize public welfare and to serve some political goals such as repressing 
activities that seriously violate the socialist market order.  Results also 
indicate several distorted and unexpected consequences in applying criminal 
                                                     
79
  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEFENDANTS SENTENCED UNDER THE GUIDELINES, 
SC02OUT (The Urb. Inst.), 2002-2008. 
80
 Motivans, supra note 59, at 4. 
81
  CCIPS Press Releases, supra note 76. 
154 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 24 NO. 1 
IP law in China, and reveals patterns of similarities and differences between 
the two countries. 
 
A. The Foci of Criminal Enforcement 
 
 Results from the descriptive analysis of the 376 IP criminal case 
sample provides a nuanced picture of the roles and foci of enforcement 
while indicating several unintended patterns of the enforcement in China.82  
Part IV.A.1 reveals an extremely high concentration of protected victims in a 
handful of economically or politically powerful companies in a few 
particular industries.83  In terms of the corporate ownership in the Chinese 
sample, 49% of the victims are SOEs and 44% are companies with 
controlling foreign shareholders or foreign IPR.84  In particular, the protected 
SOEs in the Chinese case sample converge in only a few industries: tobacco, 
alcohol, and publication.  
The profiles of victimized companies of foreign interests in the 
Chinese sample are similar to the majority of victim profiles in the U.S. 
sample. 85   In the Chinese sample, they are mostly foreign companies 
carrying products such as home electronics, computer parts, personal care 
products, software, and movies.  In the U.S. sample, the victims concentrate 
in industries with products such as software, movies, music, games, leather 
goods, pharmaceutical products, home electronics, and computer parts.  
Part IV.A.1 also reveals that the majority of infringed companies carry 
nationally or internationally well-known top brands or copyrights.  Finally, 
in Part IV.A.3, the article compares the distribution of counterfeit 
merchandise petitioned to the administrative agency in China to the 
distribution of counterfeit merchandise in the criminal case sample.  
Generally speaking, the distribution of consumer petitions is much more 
widespread and diffuse. 
1. Corporate Ownership, Industries, and Brands of the Victims 
Above all, statistical analysis reveals an extremely high concentration 
of protected IP infringement victims in a handful of economically or 
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  See infra Part IV.A. 
83
  See infra Part IV.A. 
84
  See infra Part IV.A. 
85
  See infra Part IV.A. 
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politically powerful companies in a few particular industries.  These 
companies are large corporations with the biggest market shares in the U.S. 
sample and large SOEs or companies of foreign interest in the Chinese 
sample.  The majority of infringed companies in the U.S. case sample are 
either big domestic private companies or multinational corporations; many 
of them are publicly held corporations.  There are no SOEs in the U.S. 
sample.  In comparison, in the Chinese sample, 49% of the victims are SOEs 
(which also include a few public institutions (shiye danwei 事业单位)86 and 
44% are companies with controlling foreign shareholders or foreign IPR 
(companies of foreign interests). 87   Domestic private and collective 
companies constitute a very small proportion (6.7%).88  
In particular, the protected SOEs converge in only a few industries, 
whose markets are tightly controlled by the state and monopolized by SOEs: 
tobacco, alcohol, and, to a much lesser extent, the publishing industries.89    
Those frequently victimized trademarks include many nationally or 
regionally renowned top tobacco and alcohol brands.  The pirated books are 
usually bestsellers, dictionaries, textbooks, and complementary material 
published by state-owned publishers.  
 According to market demands, most of the pirated optical disks in 
China are pirated movies and software, but they also include music CDs, TV 
episodes, games, and other electronic publications.90   In terms of corporate 
ownership, these pirated optical disks are very likely to contain best-selling 
movies and TV episodes produced by state-owned movie studios or 
domestic private movie companies as well as music released by state-owned 
publishers.91  U.S. big cinema hits are also popular in China.92  Domestic 
                                                     
86
  SOEs here are defined as companies dominated by state capital or state shareholders with 
stockholding rights. 
87
  Companies of foreign interests are defined to include foreign companies, companies 
carrying infringed foreign brands, and companies dominated by foreign shareholders with 
stockholding rights, including Taiwanese and Hong Kong companies, brands, or shareholders. 
88
  See Table 2. 
89
  See Table 3. 
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  Zhou Haibin, Fu Shidi, Hai Dandan & Chao Guodong, Guoyou Dianying zhipian Chang 
Ruhe Niepan (国有电影制片厂如何涅槃 ) [How Will Chinese State-Owned Movie Studios 
Transform?], CHINA ECON. WEEKLY 40 (Aug. 9, 2009), available at http://www.ceweekly.cn/html
/magazine/200989926156.html. 
91
  Id.; see also see also Guojia Xingwen Chuban Guangdian Zongju [State Administration of 
Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television PRC国家新闻出版广电总局], Dianyingye Zhunru 
Zaifa Xingling [New Provisions on the Requirements for the Entry into the Movie 
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companies create or modify some of the best-selling software, but most 
software is foreign.93  
The victimized foreign companies in the Chinese sample share key 
characteristics with the U.S. corporate victim profiles.  In the Chinese 
sample, they are mostly companies carrying top brands or copyrights of such 
products as home electronics, computer parts, personal care products, as well 
as foreign software, movies, and TV series on optical disks.94  In the U.S. 
sample, the victims are highly concentrated in products such as software, 
movies, games, satellite-TV access cards, leather goods, name-brand 
apparel, pharmaceutical products, home electronics, and computer parts.95  
Finally, in most industries, the majority of the infringed IPR is 
concentrated in only a few well-known brands or corporations.  In the U.S. 
sample collected, the vast majority of the counterfeited products carry top 
brands from big companies.96  The percentage carrying top brands in the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Industry电影业准入再发新令], Sarft.Qov.Cn（Sept. 21, 2004, 17:17 PM）(describing various 
government policies that protect the market share and the development of state-owned 
movie studios), available at http://www.sarft.gov.cn/articles/2004/11/21/20070910165506770372.
html. 
92
  See id. at 38. 
93
  See generally MICHAEL PECHT, CHINA'S ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE 
FOR COMPANIES AND POLICY MAKERS WITH INTEREST IN CHINA 215-26 (2006). 
94
  See infra Table 3. 
95
  See infra Table 4.  For example, the copyrighted products and company names repeatedly 
mentioned in U.S. press releases on IP thefts frequently include the most commonly used software 
of Microsoft, Adobe, Autodesk, Symantec, Macromedia, and Rockwell Automation; cinema hits 
produced by the five major U.S. movie studios Columbia, Disney, Fox, Paramount, and Universal. 
The pirated foreign copyright products in the Chinese case sample demonstrate similar 
concentrations.  The counterfeit trademarks repeatedly mentioned in the United States are leather 
and luxury goods carrying brands such as Louis Vuitton, Prada, Gucci, Coach, and Chanel, name-
brand apparel from Disney, Nike, and Tommy Hilfiger, pharmaceutical products from Pfizer, Eli 
Lilly, Bayer Corporation, Hoffman La Roche, and AstraZeneca, and Cisco network cards and 
connectors.  In addition, the infringed foreign trademarks in the Chinese sample frequently are hair 
care products from Dove and Procter & Gamble, network products from AMP, D-LINK, and 
3COM, printer drums and cartridges from Canon, HP, and Toshiba, and cell phones from 
SAMSUNG, Motorola, and Siemens. 
96
  See infra Table 2.  The Chinese markets are not as concentrated as those of the United 
States in general, except that certain home electronics, computer parts, and personal care industries 
in China are dominated by a few top foreign companies.  For example, the market share of hair 
care products of Procter & Gamble Company in China has surpassed 40 percent since 1997.  Wang 
Fenmian, Baojie Riyongpin Diguo de Chen yu Fu (宝洁：日用品帝国的沉与浮) [Proctor & 
Gamble: The Rise and Wane of the Daily Necessity Empire], PKU BUS. REV. (Sept. 2005), 
available at http://business.sohu.com/20050926/n240455956.shtml.  In addition, as the 
consequence of heavy regulation of markets at the regional level and local protectionism for tax 
revenue, the tobacco and alcohol markets are highly fragmented, with numerous regional brands.  
Dimitrov, supra note 27, at 244.  In addition, because all optical-disk piracy cases involve 
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Chinese sample is slightly lower: 89.7%. 97   The domination of name-
branded products is especially prominent in trademark thefts, because the 
demands for cultural products—such as CDs by various musicians—are 
more diverse.98 
 
 
Figure 2.  Percentage Distribution of Ownership Type of Chinese 
Corporate Victims
99
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
numerous copyrights from multiple rights owners, each case is coded “1,” meaning that it carries 
copyrights from top companies in the distribution calculation.  As a matter of fact, most of the 
pirated works do carry copyrights from top companies with the highest market shares, such as 
movies produced by the top five movie studios and the most commonly used software created by 
top software companies.  However, the markets of pirated music and books are much more diverse 
in nature.  Zhang Zhiqiang, Zhuanxingqi Zhongguo Daoban Wenti Yanjiu [Piracy in China During 
the Transition Period] 28–30 (2005) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Nanjing University, China) 
(on file with author). 
97
  Id. 
98
  Zhang Zhiqiang, supra note 76.  
99
  N=162. The Chinese data come from the dataset of the summary judgments of criminal IP 
cases in China from 1994 to 2009.   The U.S. data used are the collected news releases on IP 
criminal cases from 2002 to 2010. 
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Table 2.  Comparison of Victim Characteristics Between the Chinese and 
U.S. Criminal IP Case Samples
100
 
 
Percentage of 
Victims Involving 
… 
State-Owned 
Enterprises 
Companies of 
Foreign Interests 
Domestic Private 
Companies 
Top 
Brands/Copyrights 
China 49.4% (N=162) 44.4% (N=162) 6.7% (N=162) 89.7% (N=343) 
United States 0 (N=239) Many Multinational 
Corporations 
Majority Over 99% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
100
  The Chinese data come from the dataset of the summary judgments of criminal IP cases in China 
from 1994 to 2009.  The U.S. data used are the collected news releases on IP criminal cases from 2002 to 
2010. See Guojia Gongshang Xingzheng Guanli Zongju ( 国家工商行政管理总局 ) [General 
Administration for Industry & Commerce], Zhongguo Gongshang Xingzheng Guanli Nianjian (中国工商
行政管理年鉴) [China Indus. & Commerce Admin. Reg. Y.B.] 1998-2009 (China Indus. and Commerce 
Press 1999-2010). 
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Table 3.  China: Distribution of Infringed IPR by Industry
101
 
 
  Number of 
Cases 
Percentage 
Copyright regular optical disks (software, movies, music, 
soap opera, and games) 
164 43.7 
pornographic optical disks  17 4.5 
regular books 17 4.5 
textbooks and complementary materials 5 1.3 
Trademark tobacco 58 15.5 
 home electronics and parts 31 8.3 
 alcohol 18 4.8 
 computer, software, and gaming products 14 3.7 
 personal care products 12 2.9 
 food 9 2.4 
 automobiles and parts 8 2.1 
 drugs and other medical products 7 1.9 
 construction materials 3 .8 
 agricultural resources and equipment 3 .8 
 apparel and leather products 3 .8 
 other products 3 .8 
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  N=375.  The Chinese data come from the dataset of summary judgments of criminal IP 
cases in China from 1994 to 2009. 
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Table 4.  The United States: Distribution of Infringed IPR by Industry 
102
 
 
 Number of 
Cases 
Percentage 
Copyright software or software titles 49 20.5 
movies 36 15.1 
music 14 5.9 
games 10 4.2 
satellite TV access cards 11 4.6 
various copyrights (including all of the 
above) 
62 25.9 
Trademark leather goods or name-brand apparel 20 8.4 
pharmaceutical products 11 4.6 
home electronics or computer parts 9 3.8 
jewelry or luxury watches 3 1.3 
agricultural products 1 .4 
food 1 .4 
various trademarks (mostly leather goods, 
apparel, and jewelry) 
9 3.8 
other copyrights and trademarks 3 1.2 
 Total 
239 100.0 
 
2. Foreign IPR-Related Businesses in China 
Considering that the overall number of foreign-holding companies in 
China is only 2.5% in 2012,103 the location of 44% of corporate victims with 
                                                     
102
  N=239. The U.S. data used are the collected news releases on IP criminal cases from 
2002 to 2010. 
103
  Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo Tongjiju (中华人民共和国统计局) [Chinese Census 
Bureau], Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 2013 (中国统计年鉴 2013) [China Stat. Y.B. 2013] 27 
(2013). 
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controlling foreign shareholders or foreign IPR in the Chinese summary 
judgment sample reveals a disproportionate concern with foreign interests by 
enforcement agencies.  In contrast, IP cases with foreign interests (including 
corporate victims from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan) concluded by civil 
courts constituted only 5.8% of all 23,518 civil IP cases in 2008.104  
Administrative agencies are much more likely to transfer an IP 
infringement case to criminal prosecution when the case involves foreign 
interests.  For example, SAIC and Administration of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine (“AQSIQ”) are the two major administrative 
agencies that transfer the vast majority of counterfeit claims for criminal 
process.  In 2007, the prosecutors brought 796 trademark thefts indictments, 
among which 229 cases were transferred by SAIC and 200 by AQSIQ.  Out 
of these 229 criminal matters transferred by SAIC, 43.7% were cases with 
foreign interests. 105   In comparison, administrative cases with foreign 
interests comprised only 24% of all trademark counterfeit and infringement 
cases processed by SAIC in 2007.106  
My interview with a former IP judge from the Beijing High Court 
revealed that, according to an internal study that the judge supervised, 
corporate complaints with foreign interests have a win rate of 71% in civil IP 
cases, much higher than the average rate for all complaints.107  The judge 
explained that the court gave certain preferential treatment to foreign 
companies not only because of the pressure from foreign businesses and 
governments, but also due to the Chinese cultural etiquette of treating 
foreign guests nicely in order to gain face (zheng mianzi 挣面子) for the host 
                                                     
104
  Guojia Zhishi Chanquan Ju (国家知识产权局) [State Intellectual Property Office of 
China], Zhongguo Zhishi Chanquan Nianjian 2009 (中国知识产权年鉴 2009) [China Intellectual 
Prop. Y.B. 2009] 111 (Intellectual Prop. Pub. House, China 2009). 
105
  Id. at 149; Guojia Gongshang Xingzheng Guanli Zongju (国家工商行政管理总局) [General 
Administration for Industry & Commerce], Zhongguo Gongsang Xingzheng Guanli Nianqjian 2008 (中国
工商行政管理年鉴 2008) [China Industry & Com. Admin. Reg. Y.B. 2008] 729 (China Indus. and 
Commerce Press 2009); See Zhongguo Zhiliang Jiandu Jianyan Jianyi Ju (中国质量监督检验检疫局) 
[General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine], Zhongguo Zhiliang Jiandu 
Jianyan Jianyi Nianjian 2007 (中国质量监督检验检疫年鉴 2007) [China Quality Supervision, Inspection 
& Quarantine Y.B. 2007] 273 (Standards Press of China 2008). 
106
  See infra Table 5. 
107
  Interview with an IP judge (July 5, 2010).   
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and build a good relationship. 108   This rationale may also explain why 
administrative agencies, such as SAIC, transfer considerable counterfeit 
cases with foreign interests for criminal prosecution.  
Despite the high priority and favoritism administrative agencies and 
judicial institutions give to IP thefts with foreign interests, detection of the 
majority of cases relies on people outside of the legal system, especially the 
corporate victims themselves.  IP criminal cases are usually initiated through 
the following channels: transfer by IP administrative agencies,109 initiation 
by the police,110 and victim complaints that go directly to court (private 
prosecution111).  The first two types of cases are brought to the court by the 
prosecution, so both are public prosecutions.  The criminal case sample the 
researcher collected indicates that private prosecutions are rather 
uncommon.  Instead, most of the time, when a company detects theft of its 
IPR it will report the crime to an administrative agency or the police and ask 
for further investigation and public prosecution.  
In the nine months between January and September of 2008, all 
administrative agencies combined transferred 445 IP thefts to the Public 
Security Bureau (“PSB”).  This number constitutes 27.5% of all IP thefts the 
PSB accepted for investigation.112  The remaining 72.5% of IP thefts were 
either detected by the PSB itself or, most likely, directly reported to them.  
Since IP thefts are not the priority of the PSB,113 one can infer that most of 
the criminal IP cases were detected and reported by others, most likely the 
victims, since IPR are private rights.  Foreign corporate victims themselves 
must have played a crucial role in pushing their cases for public prosecution.  
Public surveys reveal foreign companies in China demonstrate much 
higher consciousness of IPR and invest much more heavily in establishing 
IPR management mechanisms when compared to SOEs and domestic private 
companies.114  Interviews with several top-level IP attorneys and trademark 
                                                     
108
  Id. 
109
  See supra note 104, at 109.  
110
  Id. 
111
  Private prosecution applies to criminal proceedings and is usually brought before a court 
by an individual or private organization instead of a public prosecutor. 
112
  See supra note 99, at 104. 
113
  Gaikuang Xinxi (概况信息) [Profile Information], GONG’ANBU WANGZHAN (公安部网站) 
[MINISTRY OF PUB. SECURITY], http://www.mps.gov.cn/n16/n1282/n3463/index.html?_v=140448
6441245140448644125 (last visited November 11, 2014). 
114
  See Zhang Jun & Yang Weiguo, Woguo Qiye Zhishi Chanquan Guanli Zuangkuang 
Diaocha Fenxi [A Survey on the Corporate Management of Intellectual Property Rights], 1 
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agents indicate that the vast majority of their clients are foreign 
companies.115  Domestic private companies and SOEs, with the exception of 
some top firms, either lack a specially allocated budget to pursue IP 
infringements or would prefer to spend much less money to hire cheaper 
agents or nonprofessionals.116  
In contrast, top foreign companies are generally aggressive at 
marketing and protecting their IPR.  They hire top IP agencies or 
investigative firms to proactively look for counterfeits or pirated goods.117  
These attorneys and agents work to seek criminal—as well as administrative 
and civil—processing when cases reach prosecution thresholds.118  Given 
such a high concentration of foreign companies as victims in trademark 
cases, it appears a number of foreign companies are particularly active in 
pressing for criminal prosecution of the theft of their trademarks and 
securing the prioritizing of their cases by local criminal law enforcement.  
Equipped with ample resources and extensive expertise, these IP 
professionals can effectively facilitate governmental agencies in the 
investigative and decision-making processes of their cases.  Several 
trademark attorneys commented that they expected to “do everything 
themselves,” while cultivating good relationships with governmental 
officials and enforcement officers.119   
Some IP agents and attorneys from top firms in Beijing boasted of 
their close personal relationship (guanxi 关系 ) with enforcement agency 
officials.  Several former top administrative agency officials and judges were 
hired as partners or counselors of these IP law firms.120  These firms provide 
enforcement agencies with evidence or whatever legal or material (vehicles, 
personnel, money, or other resources) assistance they need to facilitate 
investigations. 121   Moreover, rights owners frequently have to pay case-
                                                                                                                                                              
ZHONGUO FAMING YU ZHUANLI [CHINA INVENTION & PAT.] (Zhongguo Faming Xiehui he Zhishi 
Chanquan Chubanshe, Beijing 2006). 
115
  Interview with an IP attorney (June 23, 2010); interview with an IP agent (July 6, 2010); interview 
with an IP attorney (July 7, 2010). 
116
  See interviews cited supra note 115. 
117
  Id. 
118
  Id. 
119
  Id. 
120
  Interview with an IP attorney (July 7, 2010); interview with an IP judge (July 6, 2010); interview 
with an IP attorney (June 23, 2010). 
121
  See interviews cited supra note 120. 
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handling fees or treat enforcement officers with post-raid banquets and 
entertainment in karaoke bars and massage parlors.122  
Dimitrov harshly chastises these practices of “case-handling fees” and 
special treatments as corruption that leads to “piecemeal, expensive, and 
ineffective” enforcement. 123   Some of the interactions that result in 
favoritism can be categorized as “clientelism,” in which “a sustained pattern 
of reciprocal (and usually illicit) exchange [exists] between a state patron 
and a non-state client based on personal ties and conducted via informal 
networks.” 124   These acts may not all be corrupt according to the law.  
However, “guanxi” and under-the-table payments could at least lead to 
severely unequal treatment before the law and the capture of enforcement 
agencies by a small number of rich and resourceful top foreign companies.  
Some trademark agents and attorneys commented that the practices 
noted above were so common they should not be considered corruption.125 
These practices are necessary, as the reasoning goes, because enforcement 
agencies with limited institutional capacity often hesitate to spend large 
sums of tax-payer money to initiate preliminary investigations of less serious 
infringements.126  IPR are usually considered to be just one type of economic 
interest to be weighed against other interest by administrative agencies.  As a 
result, they are not always treated as a top priority.  As long as the “case-
handling fees” are collected by the organization and are spent to process the 
case, instead of being treated as bribes by individual governmental officials, 
they are not viewed as “corruption,” according to law.127 
During my interviews, these trademark practitioners point out that the 
banquet and entertainment activities are common Chinese ways of 
networking to build relations with authorities.128  Sometimes practitioners 
have to pay the expenses of these social activities out of their own pockets 
instead of out of the company’s account because they are considered 
“personal expenses” spent socializing with friends.129   Formal rules and 
                                                     
122
  DIMITROV, PIRACY AND THE STATE, supra note 58, at 146–81; MERTHA, supra note 3, at 
165. 
123
  DIMITROV, ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION, supra note 38. 
124
  SCOTT KENNEDY, THE BUSINESS OF LOBBYING IN CHINA 128–59 (2005). 
125
   Interview with a government official in the National Copyright Administration of China (July 5, 
2010). 
126
  Id.  
127
  Interview with an IP attorney (June 23, 2010); Interview with an IP attorney (July 6, 2010). 
128
  Interview with an IP attorney (June 23, 2010); Interview with an IP attorney (July 6, 2010). 
129
  Id. 
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procedures are often meticulous, bureaucratic, and slow. 130   Thus, legal 
practitioners cut corners and seek favorable treatment through personal 
networking.131 However, these extra-legal practices such as “case-handling 
fees” and entertaining with enforcement officers might contribute to unequal 
treatment before the law and the capture of enforcement agencies by a small 
number of companies.  
Foreign companies have quickly learned the Chinese way of doing 
business and have enjoyed the benefits of these important personal 
networks. 132  Large companies with ample resources and especially large 
companies which are repeated players generally benefit more from these 
unequal and extra-legal practices than they are hurt by them.133  In contrast, 
these practices place individual infringers and small companies, especially 
people from the lower class, the unemployed, or members of a floating 
population,134  at an apparent disadvantage.  This pattern of winners and 
losers in the process of IPR enforcement is clearly shown in the profiles of 
the protected victims and convicted offenders in my case samples.135 
Moreover, one could argue that the favoritism Chinese IP 
administrative enforcement agencies and judicial institutions show to foreign 
businesses results from intense diplomatic pressure, a means to attract 
foreign investment and technology transfer, and an attempt to save the 
government’s face before the international community.  Of course, business 
lobbying is more widely acknowledged, and has more legitimate channels, 
in the United States than in China.136   Still, the capture of the criminal 
judicial system by a handful of rich and resourceful top foreign companies 
and copyright trade associations is unjustifiable and unfair to other infringed 
IPR owners who deserve criminal protection. 
 
 
 
                                                     
130
  Id. 
131
  Id. 
132
  KENNEDY, supra note 124, at 96-127.  
133
  Id. 
134
 Floating population refers primarily to migrants in China without local household registration 
status through the Chinese Hukou system. 
135
  See Liu, The Enforcement of IPR in China and the United States, supra note 11, at 251–
62, 274–75. 
136
  See generally TED NACE, GANGS OF AMERICA: THE RISE OF CORPORATE POWER AND THE 
DISABLING OF DEMOCRACY 1-18 (2003) (on how the modern corporation seeks profit and power 
in the United States by steadily bending the framework of the law and incurring destruction in its 
path). 
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Table 5.  Yearly Frequency of Trademark Counterfeit and Infringement Cases 
(shangbiao qinquan jiamao anjian) Processed by SAIC
137
 
 Total 
Number 
of SAIC 
Cases 
Cases with 
Foreign 
Interests 
Percent 
with 
Foreign 
Interests 
Transferred 
for Criminal 
Processing 
Transferred 
Cases with 
Foreign 
Interests 
Percent 
with 
Foreign 
Interests 
Percent of total cases/ 
Percent of 
Transferred Cases 
with Foreign 
Interests 
2008 47045 10944 23.3% 137 65  47.4% 0.49 
2007 42314 10148 24.0% 229 100 43.7% 0.55 
2006 41214 9286 22.5% 252 128 50.8% 0.44 
2005 39107 6607 13.4% 238 89 37.4% 0.36 
2004 40171 5401 13.4% 96 28 29.2% 0.46 
 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of Cases with Foreign Interests out of Total 
SAIC Cases and Percentage of Cases with Foreign Interests out of 
Cases Transferred for Criminal Processing, 2004–2008138 
 
3. Aggregate Administrative Enforcement Statistics as a 
 Comparison 
 
In addition to being overrepresented according to their market share, 
luxury goods sold by the top corporations are overrepresented in criminal 
enforcement vis-à-vis the administrative IP enforcement process.  The SAIC 
                                                     
137
  See Guojia Gongshang Xingzheng Guanli Zongju [General Administration for Industry 
& Commerce] ZHONGGUO GONGSANG XINGZHENG GUANLI NIANQJIAN 2003–2009 [CHINA 
INDUSTRY & COM. ADMIN. REG. Y.B. 2003-2009] 762-63 (Gongsang Chubanshe, Beijing 2004–
2010). 
138
  Id. 
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processes consumer petitions submitted through the 12315 petition network, 
detailed in Table 6.  Most (59.4% in 2008) of these petitions were disputes 
on product quality, which often involve counterfeits.139  This distribution of 
petitioned merchandise is rather distinct from the distribution of counterfeit 
merchandise in the Chinese criminal case sample listed in Table 3.  
Generally speaking, the distribution of consumer petitions is much 
more widespread and diffuse: a multitude of products belong to many more 
industries.  Some of them have significant shares among these petitions; 
however, they do not appear in the criminal case sample.  A variety of home 
electronics, food, daily necessities, and household machines constituted 
about 80% of all petitioned products.140  In contrast, tobacco, alcohol, hair 
care products, and home electronics such as network products, printer parts, 
and cell phones were highly overrepresented in the criminal case sample.141  
Furthermore, as described at the end of Part IV.A.1, these criminally 
processed counterfeits are greatly concentrated in top brands produced by 
only a few leading companies in the industry (such as hair care products 
from Dove, and Procter & Gamble brands such as Pantene and Rejoice); 
while the distribution of infringed products reflected by the petitions is much 
greater.142 
Similarly, the distribution of counterfeits processed by the AQSIQ is 
also rather distinct from that of counterfeits in the criminal case sample.  The 
top industries subject to counterfeits processed by AQSIQ in 2007 were 
food, construction material, and agricultural resources.143  Although there 
exists a high concentration of tobacco, alcohol, and personal care products 
counterfeiting among criminal trademark cases, tobacco-counterfeiting cases 
make up only 0.2% of those processed by AQSIQ.  In comparison, alcohol 
and drinks together constitute 5.9%.  Cosmetics and personal care product 
comprise only 0.6% (see Table 7).  Clearly the majority of counterfeits 
processed by AQSIQ (59.5%) either carry health or safety threats (food, 
                                                     
139
  See Guojia Gongshang Xingzheng Guanli Zongju [General Administration for Industry 
& Commerce] ZHONGGUO GONGSANG XINGZHENG GUANLI NIANQJIAN 2005–2008 [CHINA 
INDUSTRY & COM. ADMIN. REG. Y.B. 2005–2008] 172–73 (Gongsang Chubanshe, Beijing 2006–
2009).  
140
  Id. 
141
  See supra IV.A.1.  
142
   Id. 
143
  Guojia Gongshang Xingzheng Guanli Zongju [General Administration for Industry & Commerce] 
ZHONGGUO GONGSANG XINGZHENG GUANLI NIANQJIAN 2003–2009 [CHINA INDUSTRY & COM. ADMIN. 
REG. Y.B. 2003–2009] (Gongsang Chubanshe, Beijing 2004–2010). 
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construction material, personal care products, and automobile parts) or 
involve other public welfare concerns (agricultural resources, cotton, and 
other fiber products).144  Finally, aggregate official enforcement statistics 
show that administrative agencies handled the vast majority of IP 
infringements each year; the proportion of IP cases processed by the 
criminal judicial system comprise was just the tip of that iceberg.145 
In contrast with trademark counterfeiting, the distribution of 
administrative piracy cases is essentially similar to that of criminal copyright 
cases in the Chinese sample.  This finding is not surprising; piracy venders 
carry numerous copyrighted works of a multitude of authors or producers 
and they respond to market demands.  Enforcement raids and seizures of 
pirated goods can seldom specifically target a single type of product or 
products of a particular industry.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
144
  Id.  
145
  For example, in 2007, the number of All Concluded Cases Involving IP Offenses was 
only 2,684, compared to more than 100,000 IP infringements sanctioned by various administrative 
agencies.  Haiyan Liu, The Criminal Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China: Recent 
Developments and Implications, 5 ASIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 137, 141 (2010). 
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Table 6.  Percentage Distribution of Industries of Consumer Petitions 
(shensu) processed by SAIC through 12315 Web sites
146
 
 
Year Types of Merchandise Petitioned 
 Total 
Petitions 
Home 
Electronics 
Daily 
Necessities  
Food Household 
Machines  
Construction 
Materials 
2005 515543 199330 112766 64908 N/A N/A 
Percent  38.7% 21.9% 12.6% N/A Below 10% 
2006 522561 208654 113666 63065 46607 26592 
Percent  39.9% 21.8% 12.1% 8.9% 5.1% 
2007 539365 218352 126490 60575 46399 26026 
Percent    40.5% 23.5% 11.2% 8.6% 4.8% 
2008 552971 199766 123250 93755 41919 27240 
Percent  36.1% 22.3% 17.0% 7.6% 4.9% 
More 2008  Agricultural 
Production 
Source  
Medicine and 
Medical 
Items 
Wine 
(among 
Food) 
Personal Auto 
(among Household 
Machines) 
Others 
  17483 5407 6129 29820 44151 
Percent  3.2% 1.0% 1.1% 5.4% 8.0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
146
  N=552971.  See Guojia Gongshang Xingzheng Guanli Zongju [General Administration 
for Industry & Com.] ZHONGGUO GONGSANG XINGZHENG GUANLI NIANQJIAN 2005–2008 [CHINA 
INDUSTRY & COM. ADMIN. REGULATION Y.B. 2005–2008] 172–73 (Gongsang Chubanshe, Beijing 
2006–2009).  
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Table 7. Percentage Distribution of Industries of Counterfeit Cases Processed by 
AQSIQ, 2007
147 
Industry of Infringed Products Concluded Cases Percentage 
Food 44874 25.3% 
(Among Food) Alcohol and Drinks 10501 5.9% 
Construction Materials 35821 20.2% 
Agricultural Resources 15723 8.9% 
Cotton and other Fiber Products 4237 2.4% 
Automobile Parts 3471 2.0% 
Cosmetic Products 1111 0.6% 
Fake Trademarks, Signs, or Packaging 587 0.3% 
Tobacco 365 0.2% 
Other 71466 40.2% 
Total 177655 100.0% 
 
B.     Differences and Unexpected Consequences of Enforcement   
 
After comparing the subtleties of the corporate ownership, industries, 
and brands of the infringed IPR, this research reveals patterns of similarities 
and differences between the two countries.  To summarize, despite the vastly 
different macro-level factors and the big picture of rampant infringements 
and ineffective enforcement in China, the profiles of victimized trademark 
companies of foreign interests in the Chinese sample are very similar to the 
victim profiles of the U.S. sample.  
The industries of the infringed copyright products in China also are 
rather similar to those of the United States.  Most of them are optical disk 
products with only two exceptions.  First, 10.7% of the cases in the Chinese 
copyright case sample involve pirated books; in contrast, the U.S. news 
sample includes no book piracy.  In 22.4% of these Chinese pirated book 
cases, the products are pirated textbooks and complementary material, which 
are an important target of Chinese law enforcement.  Second, 6% of U.S. 
                                                     
147
  See Zhongguo Zhiliang Jiandu Jianyan Jianyi Ju [General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine], ZHONGGUO ZHILIANG JIANDU JIANYAN JIANYI NIANJIAN 
2007 [CHINA QUALITY SUPERVISION, INSPECTION & QUARANTINE Y.B. 2007] 278–79 (Zhongguo 
Biaozhuen Chubanshe, Beijing 2008). 
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copyright thefts involve modification of a satellite television access card, 
while Chinese state-owned TV stations do not seem to have pushed for the 
criminal processing of such cases, despite the frequent occurrence of such 
copyright thefts.148  
 This section elaborates on the major differences of criminal 
enforcement in the two countries.  Most importantly, statistical results 
partially support my hypotheses that the role of criminal enforcement of IPR 
in China is to prioritize public welfare and to serve some political goals such 
as repressing activities violating the socialist market order.  A substantial 
percentage (44%) of Chinese criminal IP cases concern products with health 
or safety risks, while only 9% of the cases involve such products in the U.S. 
dataset.  Moreover, 52% of Chinese trademark thefts and 11% of copyright 
thefts involve products of regulated industries.  Some of these industries also 
involve SOE monopolization or domination, including tobacco, alcohol, 
pharmaceutical manufacture, and book publication industries. 
 
1. Products with Health or Safety Risks 
 
Important differences in terms of the enforcement foci remain 
between China and the United States.  Counterfeits raising health concerns 
have become a prominent and notorious problem in China and occupy 
tremendous attention of both the criminal and administrative enforcement 
agencies.149  To put this in perspective, 19% of U.S. trademark thefts belong 
to this category (see Table 8) while as many as 63% of the Chinese 
counterfeit cases involve products that could cause health risks.150  Products 
                                                     
148
  See supra IV.1.A.; See supra Table 3.  
149
   See CHEN CHUANYI (陈传意), TIANDI RENXIN: ZHONGUO DAIJA ZHILIE BEIWANGLU (天地人心: 中
国打假治劣备忘录) [Heaven and Hell in the Human Heart: The Memo of Cracking Down and Governing 
Fake Products in China] 58–127 (2006) (China) (providing vivid narratives of cases of various counterfeit 
drugs and poisonous food in China). 
150
  Counterfeits that might cause health concerns are inferior quality food (tobacco, alcohol, 
salt, and other food), drugs and other medical products, dietary supplements, and personal care 
products (hair care products and toothpaste).  Counterfeits that pose potential safety risks include 
automobiles, auto parts, construction material, and certain home electronics (relay sockets, 
electronic wiring, and residual current circuit-breakers).  Admittedly, not all counterfeit products 
pose physical harm or health threats; for example, many food vendors counterfeit the more 
marketable brands of others to increase sales, selling perfectly safe and healthy food.  In addition, 
the offense of Manufacturing and Selling Fake and Shoddy Goods charges are to specifically deal 
with crimes involving health or safety threats; however, trademark offenses are sometimes used 
either because they are easier to prove in court or because more than one charge is applicable.  See 
CHEN CHUANYI, supra note 149 at 58–142, 215-61. 
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with safety concerns do not seem to be as big a focus of enforcement in the 
sample as those with health threats.  After establishing the 2004 Intellectual 
Property Task Force, the United States started to prioritize the prosecution of 
IP cases involving threats to public health and safety.151  However, very few 
of these cases have been prosecuted.  
Although 44% of criminal IP cases in China concern products posing 
health or safety threats—a sizable proportion of cases—only 47% of these 
health or safety threat cases are actually tobacco and alcohol counterfeits.  
Other equally serious types of IP thefts comprise much smaller 
percentages.152  For example, all other food counterfeits make up only 5.5% 
of all criminal cases carrying public welfare threats in China; 
pharmaceuticals and other medical counterfeits constitute just 4.4%.153 
China cracks down heavily on crimes that seriously undermine the 
socialist market economy.  Although IPR is defined mainly as a private right 
in U.S. law, IP criminal offenses are considered crimes against the public in 
China and are listed in the Chinese Criminal Code under “Chapter III 
Crimes Undermining the Order of the Socialist Market Economy.”154  Thus, 
this strong public welfare focus is a planned and unique characteristic of 
Chinese criminal IP law.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
151
  See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S TASK FORCE ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olp/docs/i
p_task_force_report.pdf; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROGRESS REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S 
TASK FORCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1, 10, 21 – 22 (2006), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2006/06/22/ipreport61906.pdf; EXECUTIVE 
OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., 2010 U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 
COORDINATOR ANNUAL REPORT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 5 (2011), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/ipec_annual_report_feb2011.pdf. 
152
  See infra Table 3. 
153
  Id. 
154
  See  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (中华人民共和国刑法) [Criminal Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by Order No. 83 of the President of the People’s 
Republic of China, Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997), art. 3, §7 (China), translated in 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384075.htm. 
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Table 8.  Comparison of Percentages of Cases concerning Products of Political or 
Public Priorities between the Chinese and the U.S. Criminal IP Cases
155
 
 
Percentage 
Products 
Involving … 
Number 
of Cases 
Political or 
Public 
Priorities 
Including… 
Health 
Concerns 
Safety 
Concerns 
Governmentally 
Controlled Markets 
China IP Thefts: 375 43.5% 27.7% 2.9% 28.3%  
Copyright 210 19.5%  0 0 10.5%   
Trademark 165 74.5% 63% 6.7% 51.5%  
U.S. IP Thefts: 239 8.8% 5.4% 2.5% 0  
Copyright 178 0.5% 0 0 0  
Trademark 61 29.4% 19.1% 8.8% 0  
 
 
2. State Regulation of SOE Monopolized Markets in China 
 
 The second unique aspect of the focus of IP criminal enforcement in 
China is the heavy presence of SOEs among the corporate victims.  In the 
Chinese IP criminal case sample, 49% of the victims are SOEs, which means 
that as many as 88.5% of the domestic corporate victims are SOEs.156  This 
is a rather high percentage considering state-holding companies constitute 
only 3.3% of all registered corporations in China in 2012.157  Additionally, 
these SOEs converge in only a few industries (tobacco, alcohol, and book 
industries) that are monopolized by SOEs and are tightly controlled by the 
state.  This unusually high percentage of SOE victims indicates that the 
Chinese government has used criminal IP law to ensure state tax revenues 
instead of protecting the private IPR of domestic companies.  The state 
pursuit of tax revenues through such unexpected means coincides with 
Tamanaha’s argument that when law does not mirror a society, the law will 
                                                     
155
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be more subject to instrumental use by select groups, especially the 
economic or political elite.158 
While tobacco and alcohol counterfeiting can sometimes cause serious 
physical harm,159  tobacco and alcohol counterfeit cases receive far more 
enforcement attention in comparison to other similarly dangerous crimes, 
such as food counterfeiting.  As a matter of fact, most counterfeit cigarettes 
and alcohol do not cause worse health problems than do genuine products.  
Most counterfeit or illegal cigarettes on the market are smuggled top luxury 
brands or cigarettes manufactured by well-equipped underground 
factories. 160   On the other hand, some are low-end cigarettes posing as 
luxury brands.161  But even with these low-end cigarettes, only a very small 
proportion is handmade or made with inferior quality tobacco.162   Most 
counterfeit alcohol products pose as top luxury brands while using either 
low-end or homebrewed alcohol.163  Even so, extremely rare cases involve 
deadly or poisonous alcohol.164  
What is worse, the state frequently uses anti-piracy crackdowns and 
the offense of Unlawful Business Operation to enforce media censorship.165  
Although the majority of publications seized by the Anti-pornography and 
Illegal Publications Office (APIPO)—the most powerful agency handling 
antipiracy enforcement—are pirated, the designated responsibilities of 
APIPO are to tackle pornography and illegal publications (sao huang da fei 
扫黄打非) and regulate and macromanage the publishing industry.166 Not 
until 2003, and only under intense international pressure, did the APIPO and 
Copyright Administration start to transfer more piracy cases for criminal 
processing.167  
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3. Additional Regulated Products in China 
 
In the Chinese sample, 51.5% of trademark thefts and 10.5% of 
copyright thefts involve products of government-controlled markets. 168  
Although the U.S. government regulates certain industries out of various 
public policy considerations, to some degree the strict government control of 
markets is a phenomenon unique to the Chinese economy.  The regulated 
markets include most domestic pharmaceutical manufacture, tobacco, 
alcohol, and book publication.169  
In total, as many as 74.5% of the Chinese trademark thefts involve 
infringed products either with public welfare concerns or in governmentally 
controlled markets.170  In addition, 19.5% of the Chinese copyright thefts 
involve products that are considered prioritized enforcement targets,171 such 
as pornographic optical disks, textbooks, and complementary material.172  In 
comparison, only 29.4% of the trademark thefts and almost none of the 
copyright thefts in the U.S. dataset involve these prioritized industries, and 
they are all counterfeits that could incur health or safety risks.173 
The results in Part IV.B reveal that the role of criminal enforcement of 
IPR in China is to prioritize collective interests and public welfare and to 
serve politically prioritized goals such as repressing activities that seriously 
violate the socialist market order.174  Previous findings of the foci of U.S. 
criminal enforcement protecting top companies in a handful of industries 
confirms that the primary goal of criminal enforcement of IPR in the United 
States is to protect private property rights, especially the interests of large 
IPR-intensive businesses.175  Since the overall enforcement of IPR in China 
is highly proactive and is only one of their many responsibilities, the 
enforcement agencies, including the criminal judicial institutions, have 
tremendous discretion to select their enforcement priorities and reject other 
cases. In this context, the overall strength, foci, and patterns of enforcement 
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tell us much about the operation of institutions relating to IP enforcement 
and the forces behind them. 
 
V. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
The analysis in the previous section reveals significant similarities, 
differences, and unintended consequences of the indigenization of IP.  The 
following section considers how my findings contribute to an understanding 
of IP crime and the criminal enforcement of IPR, and explores their 
theoretical implications for larger issues of legal transplantation and legal 
pluralism.   
Beyond the questions on the characteristics, foci, and consequences of 
enforcement in practice, what are the most important factors that determine 
the major patterns of criminal enforcement in China and the United States?  
Current analysis illustrates that various industry-level economic, 
technological, political, situational and institutional factors are involved in 
the criminal enforcement of IPR on the ground.  
The nuances of Chinese criminal IP enforcement differ from what the 
proponents of legal transplantation intended and are subject to the influence 
of many mid-level situational factors and industry characteristics.  In 
particular, the narrow foci and evident enforcement patterns indicate that the 
following forces have an overwhelming effect on criminal enforcement of 
IPR in China: (1) vehement business lobbying by a handful of foreign 
trademark corporations; (2) the size and market concentration of top firms in 
an industry; (3) trade association lobbying efforts; (4) state tax interests in a 
few industries; (5) public welfare and public policy concerns; and (6) other 
political goals, such as control of the media and importation restrictions on 
publications.  
This summary of the forces behind the criminal enforcement of IPR 
confirms David Sugarman’s views on the possible consequences of legal 
transplantation when law does not fit in with the indigenous context.176  
When, in practice, the legitimacy of law is not acknowledged, decisions to 
observe or enforce the law by citizens and state officials can be influenced 
by numerous extra-legal factors.177  Under the influence of the six extra-legal 
factors summarized above, a disproportionately high percentage of criminal 
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IP enforcement in China involve a small number of foreign companies, 
SOEs in particular state-controlled industries, products posing health or 
safety threats, or other regulated industries, such as publishing.178  
 Foremost, the great similarities across the foci of criminal 
enforcement in the United States and China described in Section IV.A.1 
demonstrate that business factors are dominant factors not only for the 
overall IP enforcement strength of a country, but also for enforcement 
priorities.  First, copyright-related industries are more active in using 
associations to fight piracy due to the diverse nature of cultural and media 
products and the suffusion of small businesses in these industries.179  When 
comparing copyright thefts to trademark thefts, even a small-scale piracy 
case tends to involve numerous pirated works, such as books or optical disk 
publications of various producers and copyright owners.  Thus, copyright 
enforcement requires a collective business lobbying strategy by copyright 
companies/owners acting through their trade associations or other copyright 
collective-management organizations. 180   As Scott Kennedy’s study on 
business lobbying indicated, industries full of small firms with low market 
concentration and regular interfirm technical and business cooperation, such 
as the software industry, developed more associations that functioned well in 
China.181  
In contrast, criminal-counterfeiting cases involving home electronics, 
computers and parts, and personal care products concentrated in the top 
brands of the largest firms in these industries as a result of vehement 
lobbying activities of individual firms.  Large foreign firms dominate these 
industries in China. 182   Similar to the Chinese enforcement foci, in the 
United States, the criminal enforcement of trademarks was captured by a 
few of the most successful large firms in the following industries: leather 
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goods, pharmaceutical products, home electronics, computer parts, jewelry, 
and luxury watches.183  
Further research reveals that large firms in highly concentrated 
markets possessed ample resources and substantial clout to directly interact 
with and influence governmental agencies, instead of relying on business 
associations.184  The size of the chief firms and related market-concentration 
level in an industry played crucial roles in shaping the mode of business 
lobbying for that industry. 185  For example, the large size of top companies 
in the consumer electronics industries enabled those firms to act more 
aggressively when lobbying the government for favorable policies.186  The 
tremendous impact these firms had on the local economy in a region gave 
them considerable clout during negotiations with the local government.187  
In trademark industries where large firms prefer direct contact with 
governmental officials, the function of associations is limited.188  Unlike the 
International Intellectual Property Alliance, the International Trademark 
Association in China missed important opportunities to shape Chinese 
trademark law at its critical lawmaking stages before 1993.189  As a result, 
foreign companies carrying leading trademarks in China set up the Quality 
Brands Protection Committee in 2000, which has lobbied at the ground level 
and frequently updates Chinese governmental agencies in order to facilitate 
the tackling of counterfeiting issues.190 
In Chinese tobacco and alcohol industries, the function of trade 
associations is almost irrelevant for anti-counterfeiting enforcement.  
Tobacco and alcohol industries have low market concentration and are 
permeated with SOEs of various sizes.  Kennedy reports consistent findings 
that the function of associations in the steel industry in China is marginal for 
policy changes.191 Likewise, the steel industry is dominated by SOEs, which 
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all have direct ties with the government.192  As a result, these SOEs can 
initiate negotiations on policy issues prior to the government’s promulgation 
of policies.193 
The dominance of business factors and the consequent similar 
enforcement foci in the two countries verify Tamanaha’s arguments that 
transnational commercial rules—including IPR—are founded on market-
based business factors and demands and not different national or local norms 
and practices.194  Transnational commercial rules and trade associations are 
created to advance business interests or to circumvent the state’s power to 
control economic affairs.195  
Political factors comprise the second most important determinants of 
the foci of criminal enforcement in China.  These include political 
interference by the state to protect state tax revenue in luxury goods, 
especially in the tobacco and alcohol industries, and public policies to fight 
against counterfeits posing health and safety threats.196  What's more, strict 
media control, and importation restrictions on foreign books, periodicals, 
audio-visual publications, and other media products highly limits citizens’ 
access to these publications through the legal channel; pirates take full 
advantage of this situation.197  
Previous sections198  of this article discuss the incentives and deep 
cultural roots of these political factors.  Political factors exert a strong direct 
impact on the Chinese criminal judicial system due to the lack of judicial 
independence and the close involvement of politics in law.199  On the books, 
the criminal enforcement of IPR is a legal action that could be influenced by 
legal factors and by administrative agencies’ structures and activities.  This 
empirical scrutiny reveals, however, that the actual foci of enforcement are 
largely determined by situational-level business factors, political priorities, 
and public welfare concerns. 
Finally, technological development and digital publications and audio-
visual products play a crucial role in changing the format of copyright 
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infringements and enforcement foci.  Since 2005, along with the dramatic 
increase in internet access and the prosperity of web media, there has been a 
rapid decrease in seized pirated publications on the street and increasingly 
frequent and large-scale online anti-piracy crackdowns.200   Case samples 
from the two countries demonstrate a greater proportion of the 
counterfeiting, marketing, and trading activities have also moved to the 
virtual space.201 
 
VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Analysis of counterfeiting and piracy problems in China illustrates 
that current IP infringements arise in the context of entrenched economic, 
cultural, political, legal, and institutional factors and interests.  It is 
unreasonable for foreign companies to expect enforcement agencies with 
limited institutional capacity to make fundamental changes to the influence 
of these macro-factors in a short period of time.  Worse yet, ongoing rapid 
criminalization and politically motivated enforcement crackdowns bring 
little change in the context of these macro-factors, while at the same time 
reinforcing social inequality and exacerbating problems embedded in the 
criminal judicial system.202  
Civil society and social activists have long worried about the 
legitimacy of the aggressive expansion of levels and boundaries of IPR 
protection globally. 203   Some IPR legal scholars, economists, and social 
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activists argue there should be a fine balance between the “rights of IPR 
owners and creators” and the “rights of users.” 204   That is, the balance 
between offering economic incentives for more market-oriented creation and 
lowering transaction costs to promote dissemination and public enjoyment of 
the creation, which could in turn stimulate more creation. 205   Legally 
speaking, Chinese law has granted IP owners comprehensive rights and 
high-level protection as required by the TRIPS Agreement.206  These legal 
changes are unlikely to be reversed given that the Chinese government has 
been somewhat persuaded that these IP laws are beneficial for economic 
development.207  
Considering these public policy, social justice, and current 
development points, the practical goal is to improve IPR protection while 
reducing business capture, illegitimate state intervention, unfair and unequal 
enforcement, and the consequent abuse of taxpayers’ money.  To achieve 
these goals, China must encourage and promote growth of the economy and 
IP related industries, establish respect for rights and rules in general, 
cultivate the IPR consciousness of right-owners and companies, encourage 
the mobilization of private rights, allow citizen supervision of governmental 
activities, and adopt reactive enforcement policies.  
First, China needs to continue to encourage and promote the growth of 
the economy and of IP-related industries.  Some Chinese, including some of 
the IP attorneys the author interviewed, believe that because of low 
economic development and enormous regional disparity in China, it is 
understandable that startup businesses would counterfeit top brands since 
they lack adequate capital and retail chains to build up their own competitive 
brands.208  As local businesses grow and become better able to establish their 
own brands, society will become more trademark conscious, and the overall 
counterfeit rate will drop.  For example, there were several localities 
notorious for their rampant local counterfeit markets and businesses in 
Zhejiang Province.209  Today, the local counterfeiting has declined, along 
with the legal environment and the performance of administrative agencies 
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that tackle infringements. 210  Empirical studies support the positive 
correlation between economic and technological growth with IPR awareness 
and protection at the macro-level.211  Obviously, it will take time for China 
to build up its economy, develop its own brands, and overcome regional 
disparities.  However, for a country as vast as China, one needs to be aware 
of the tension created by regional disparity and uneven development.212  
While economic growth could reduce piracy and counterfeiting, highly 
uneven development sparked by economic growth might fuel piracy and 
counterfeiting, at least temporarily.213 
Second, to reduce infringements, the more effective solution than 
proactive enforcement is to cultivate the IPR consciousness of citizens and 
companies and encourage the claiming and mobilization of private rights by 
private entities.  Due to the vehement educational and propaganda 
campaigns and highly publicized enforcement operations carried out by the 
Chinese government after China joined the WTO in 2001, the majority of 
Chinese citizens now seem to have some knowledge about IP, piracy and 
counterfeiting activities, and the existence of IP law.214  Nevertheless, piracy 
and counterfeiting are rampant, and an unusually high percentage of people 
would not hesitate to buy pirated or counterfeit goods.215 It would not be a 
quick  task to cultivate the IPR consciousness of common citizens and to 
establish their respect for rights and rules.  Only large-scale and sustained 
education and outreach programs for rights owners, the populace, and 
especially the younger generation are likely to gradually reshape people’s 
conceptions of IPR; though one has to question the legitimacy of attempting 
to convert people away radically from their indigenous social norms.   It will 
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take at least a whole generation for new ideas and norms to be indoctrinated 
into a new generation from their early years.216  
Third, in terms of enforcement mechanisms, the Chinese government 
should continue to use and promote reactive enforcement methods such as 
the civil enforcement.  The central government has already been 
experimenting to move from proactive administrative and criminal 
enforcement to more reactive enforcement on a small scale.   One 
interviewees from the China Academy of Social Science explained that civil 
remedies were the main IP enforcement mechanism in most developed 
countries, including the United States.  In contrast, the dominance of the 
administrative enforcement mechanism in China was a necessity because the 
IP law transplanted by the state can only be proactively implemented on the 
ground. 217   With the rapid increase of the institutional capacity of the 
Chinese civil IP system, the central government realizes that the time has 
come to shift from proactive enforcement to more reactive enforcement.218  
This reform direction is consistent with the state’s reform goal to streamline 
and simplify the government and focusing on providing services according 
to the needs of businesses and citizens, as defined by the latter.219   One 
reform emphasis is on reducing governmental power and functions—which 
includes many IP-administering and anti-infringement responsibilities—that 
can induce rent-seeking behavior out of agency self-interest.220  
Small-scale experiments to slim down the enforcement teams of 
various IP administrative agencies and combine at the local level have been 
quite successful.  For example, Shenzhen City established the Market 
Supervision Administration of Shenzhen (Shenzhenshi Shichang Jiandu 
Guanli Ju 深圳市市场监督管理局) by combining the administrative 
functions of the original SAIC, AQSIQ, Intellectual Property Office, and the 
food and pricing supervision functions of the Food and Drug Administration 
(Shipin Yaopin Jiandu Guanli Ju 食品药品监督管理局) and the Bureau of 
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Health. 221  The Intellectual Property Protection Office (Zhishi Chanquan 
Baohu Chu 知识产权保护) under the Market Supervision Administration 
became the single office that protects and enforces copyrights, trademarks, 
patents, trade secrets, and geographical indications all together.222   Despite 
the substantial reduction in the number of administrative agency units, staff, 
and as many as three quarters of the cadres, the administration and 
protection of IPR were reported to have been strengthened after the 
reform.223  Similar experiments have been carried out in Chongqing City, 
Fuzhou City, and Guangdong Province.224 
Although the time seems ripe for promoting reform on a larger scale, 
institutional and bureaucratic obstacles have been tremendous, especially in 
the area of trademark administrative enforcement.225  The huge and powerful 
SAIC, AQSIQ, and their local offices are unwilling to slim down, especially 
since a great proportion of their cadres would be either demoted or 
transferred.  Both agencies are well-established, with substantial political 
influence and powerful party leaders at the top; thus, their opposition is the 
biggest reform obstacle.  In addition, the Patent Office inside the State 
Intellectual Property Office makes a reasonable argument that patent 
protection is too complex and technical for its office to merge with other 
enforcement teams.226  
Fortunately, there are far fewer obstacles to reform in the area of 
copyright enforcement in terms of switching from administrative 
enforcement to judicial enforcement.227  Copyright enforcement has been 
sluggish and sporadic due to the very limited institutional capacity and the 
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political salience of the Copyright Administration.228   In addition to the 
absence of bureaucratic obstacles, copyright officials tend to regard their 
agency as a service institute for copyright owners instead of a proactive 
enforcement agency.229  The officials know that one should not expand the 
agency’s enforcement capacity just to strengthen its institutional power.230  
Consequently, the numbers of IP infringement processed in civil courts each 
year have expanded more rapidly than the annual numbers of administrative 
cases.   Hence, the overall direction of the reform of IP enforcement in China 
is rather clear, but the expansion of such reform on a larger scale faces 
tremendous obstacles.  The central government needs to act in order to 
overcome the political and institutional obstacles discussed in this article. 
Fourth, Chinese citizens lack the power to supervise governmental 
activities and to ensure the use of its enforcement powers serve state 
interests only.231  The concentration of IP thefts in the tobacco, alcohol, and 
publication industries speaks strongly to how easily the Chinese government 
can intervene in the criminal judicial system and use various enforcement 
resources in creative ways to blatantly work for state interests and to control 
the media.232  Such abuse of public resources is unfair to taxpayers and to 
IPR owners whose rights deserve criminal protection. Chinese citizens need 
more effective channels to hold the government accountable and the 
activities of the administrative agencies regulating these industries need to 
be made more transparent. 
Fifth, and most problematic, current punitive enforcement in these 
areas does not address the roots of rampant piracy and tobacco and alcohol 
counterfeiting.233  These problems are grounded in incentives embedded in 
broader-level industry arrangements, political policies, and enforcement 
institutions.  Some of these problems call for large-scale reforms or a 
fundamental overhaul of the system. Copyright enforcement cannot be 
improved by a few sporadic and superficially result-oriented campaign-style 
crackdowns each year. Local anti-piracy enforcement teams and civil IP 
tribunals under the prefecture level should be established extensively to 
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handle consistent, regular enforcement and implementation and to focus on 
habitual offenders and large-scale infringements. The Chinese government 
should open its restriction on the importation and distribution of U.S. 
blockbusters and other foreign movies so people will not have such strong 
incentives to buy or download pirated DVDs of foreign films.  
Finally, China should establish monitoring mechanisms to regulate 
corporate lobbying activities in order to prevent corruption and attempts to 
capture the system.  The Chinese government should have stricter regulation 
of business lobbying, especially business lobbying in highly concentrated 
markets and policy negotiations by SOEs.  The purpose of such regulation 
should not be simply to prevent and punish corruption.  Rather, it should 
monitor business capturing attempts and systematic unequal enforcement, 
which exacerbate existing social stratification.  Moreover, governments 
should reserve a proportion of resources to protect the IPR of small 
businesses and individuals, and the fair use and other rights of IPR users 
given their rights have largely been disregarded by enforcement agencies.  
If enforcing private IPR is not the priority of an enforcement team, it 
might be reasonable sometimes for agencies to collect “case-handling fees” 
to cover costs and to require assistance from rights owners. In such a case, 
the fee should be standardized and the procedure should be transparent.  
Otherwise, the fee could become a secret bid for prioritized enforcement 
among multiple rights-owners and provide corrupted officials or agencies 
opportunity to extract bribe from businesses and IPR owners.  Lack of 
regulation and transparency on these matters contributes to corporate clients’ 
serious dissatisfaction with the performance of enforcement agencies.234 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, the narrow foci and obvious enforcement patterns that 
emerged in the analysis indicate that the following forces have an 
overwhelming effect on criminal IP enforcement in China: (1) vehement 
business lobbying by a handful of powerful foreign trademark corporations; 
(2) trade association lobbying efforts, including foreign associations exerting 
external pressure; (3) the size and market concentration of top firms in an 
industry; (4) state interests in industries regulated by the state and 
monopolized by SOEs; (5) designated enforcement priorities, including 
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public welfare and public policy concerns; and (6) other political goals, such 
as control of the media and importation restrictions on publications.  As a 
result, a disproportionately high percentage of the protected IP theft victims 
in China involves foreign companies, SOEs in state-controlled industries, 
companies carrying health or safety-related products, and companies in 
regulated industries (such as publishing). 
Currently, the practical goals for China are to promote IPR protection 
while reducing business capture, instrumental usage by the state, and 
unequal enforcemen.t In order to achieve these goals, the root solutions are 
to develop IP-related industries, to cultivate the IPR consciousness of 
citizens to encourage the mobilization of private rights by private entities, to 
allow citizen supervision of governmental activities, and to move from 
proactive enforcement to more reactive enforcement. Other preventative and 
monitoring mechanisms should also be established beyond enforcing IP, 
such as stricter regulation both of counterfeits that pose health or safety 
threats and of corporate lobbying activities to prevent corruption and capture 
attempts.  Expanding criminalization and intensifying criminal enforcement 
will not effectively lead to better IP enforcement and would incur expensive 
social costs and raise serious questions of justice.  
